Thursday, January 4, 2007

Canada, Gaza and Deluded Opinions

The Canadian government has embraced the Neville Chamberlain approach to global politics; appease your enemies and desert your friends. Canada has been vocal in its opposition to the Iraq War and intentionally subverted global opinion by sheltering cowardly army deserters. Moreover, Canada maintains a limited economic and diplomatic boycott of Israel. Ostensibly, this policy seemed effective. The only nations exposed to terrorist attacks were those who outwardly supported the Imperial American War initiative (Madrid and London) and the Zionist Occupation (Israel). The liberal sentiment that Islamic terrorism was a symptom of adverse foreign policy proliferated globally and millions marched with their proverbial fingers in their ears chanting "terrorism is not our problem!"

Until last week.

Canadian intelligence infiltrated an Islamic terrorist cell and prevented an imminent catastrophe. Undoubtedly, the Canadians would have felt indignant, betrayed. After all, they did everything that Mr. bin Laden requested. Among the conservative thinkers there was no surprise. This development merely reiterates what the right has been saying for decades; that the objective of Islamic terrorists is to destabilize the West and establish an international Shariah theocracy. Naturally, these intentions are as much an affront to moderate Muslims as they are to others.

Also in the news, Israeli Internal Security Minister (and former Shin Bet agent), Avi Dichter, addressed the Israeli Cabinet. He presented a report about the continuous barrage of rocket attacks from Gaza, numbering 500 since the Israeli withdrawal. He observed that "just as the IDF responded harshly to Katyushas in the North, it should wield a strong hand against Kassams in the South" and employed strong language emphasizing the need for the IDF to "turn Beit Hanun 'into a ghost town' ". Naturally, the cabinet rejected his suggestions. Olmert: "We have strong means in our arsenal, but sometimes international considerations limit their effectiveness. It's not worth harming civilians. We have gotten rid of our dream from childhood that Israel can do everything alone. These dreams do not exist anymore." Curious.

When Sharon conceived the idea of unilateral disengagement, he legitimately believed that strategic settlement withdrawal was militarily advantageous. His motivations were pragmatic and he was certainly, if not deliberately, indifferent to irrelevant global opinion. At the time of the withdrawal empirical evidence (return of the Sinai to Egypt) suggested that his reasoning was plausible. Sadly, he was wrong.

One year on and enthused by delusions of victory, Palestinian terrorist groups have consolidated their power base within Gaza. A recent IDF report cites that "Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's ambitious plan to withdraw from large parts of the West Bank will not do anything to decrease the scope of daily violence in the region. Instead, the army is moving forward based on a working plan that it is nearing another round of bloody violence with the Palestinians." The report identifies the rigidity of Hamas' ideology as the main prospective source of conflict. For Olmert, however, there has been a phase shift from securing Israeli lives to securing world opinion. It seems that the "childhood dreams" of self determination and security that Olmert apparently envisaged (but didn't pass onto his kids, one of whom refused to serve in the IDF) are far less important than what French cheese makers and Canadian beaver hunters seem to think.

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